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Abstract 
The mineral energy sources, possessed by a certain state or remaining an object of interest for it, may form a basis 
for political activities, both oriented on usage either of the purely political (non-militarized) or militarized methods. 
The usage of these sources in the political context may have a natural impact on the essence of sustainable devel-
opment, especially then if to juxtapose it with previous experiences of the mankind. The natural gas based energy 
policy seems to be the key factor for the above political activities of states with imperial ambitions, as the contem-
porary Russia. Referring to the shale gas, the syndrome as such concerns the monopolistic position of the USA in 
terms of the applied exploitation technologies. The size of coal mining and steel production at the turn of the 19 th 
and 20th century, or oil fields’ possession and their usage before and during WW II used to play such a role in the 
past. In both of these cases there were necessary prerequisites for planning the military campaigns in potential 
wars (envisaged as successful indeed). Fortunately such an extreme way of conducting political activities is not 
confirmed today. Following the same trace the policy of the possessed energy sources’ usage, or taking over those 
being in possession of others, might ultimately lead towards maintaining an economic and perhaps political su-
premacy of ones over others. On the one hand it demonstrates the policy of pressure led by stronger, imperially 
oriented states against weaker and dependent ones. On the other one, it shows the results of the mutual antagonizing 
policy of the latter stimulated by the stronger state- and non-state-like entities, having their own interests. Due to 
some experiences, taken from the most recent past, one can speculate, if the possessed or desired energy sources 
may be utilized as a tool for unequivocally political decisions, also in the military sphere. It is hard to be optimistic 
bearing in mind the rule that history tends to repeat itself. Such scepticism is even deeper if we realize that the 
control over the water reserves remains a source of the future large-scale international conflicts.  
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Streszczenie 
Mineralne zasoby energetyczne, posiadane przez dane państwo lub będące obiektem jego zainteresowania, mogą 
stanowić podstawę do działań politycznych zorientowanych na użycie tak metod czysto politycznych, jak i zmili-
taryzowanych. Wykorzystanie tych zasobów w kontekście politycznym może mieć naturalny wpływ na istotę 
                                                          
1 The article is a revised and significantly extended version of the presentation delivered by me during the Club of Rome 
Annual Conference, titled The Power of the Mind, Bucharest (Romania), September 30-October 2, 2012. 
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zrównoważonego rozwoju wtedy zwłaszcza, jeśli zestawić to z wcześniejszymi doświadczeniami ludzkości. Poli-
tyka energetyczna opierająca się na zasobach gazu wydaje się być czynnikiem kluczowym dla wzmiankowanych 
powyżej politycznych działań państw z ambicjami imperialnymi, jak współczesna Rosja. W nawiązaniu do gazu 
łupkowego syndrom taki dotyczy z kolei monopolistycznej pozycji USA w zakresie stosowanych technologii wy-
dobywczych. Poziom wydobycia węgla i produkcja stali na przełomie wieków: XIX i XX lub posiadanie pól 
naftowych i dysponowanie nimi przed i w trakcie II wojny światowej spełniały taką rolę w przeszłości. W obu 
tych przypadkach niezbędne okazywały się także przesłanki na rzecz planowania kampanii wojskowych w poten-
cjalnych wojnach (oczywiście przewidywanych jako zwycięskie). Tak ekstremalny sposób politycznego działania 
nie ma szczęśliwie swojego odzwierciedlenia obecnie. Podążając tym śladem polityka wykorzystania posiadanych 
zasobów energetycznych, albo przejęcia będących w posiadaniu innych, miała ostatecznie doprowadzić do  utrzy-
mania przewagi gospodarczej i przez to politycznej jednych państw nad drugimi. Z jednej strony demonstruje to 
politykę nacisku prowadzoną przez państwa silniejsze, zorientowane imperialnie przeciwko państwom słabszym 
i zależnym. Z drugiej wszakże pokazuje, do czego może prowadzić polityka wzajemnego antagonizowania tych 
ostatnich, stymulowana przez kierujące się własnym interesem silne podmioty państwowe i niepaństwowe. Na 
kanwie doświadczeń z najnowszej przeszłości można spekulować czy posiadane lub pożądane zasoby energe-
tyczne będą wykorzystywane jako narzędzie do podejmowania działań jednoznacznie politycznych, w tym mili-
tarnych. Trudno być optymistą, jeżeli przypomnieć regułę, że historia lubi się powtarzać. Ten sceptycyzm pogłębia 
się, jeśli przyjąć, że źródłem przyszłych konfliktów międzynarodowych na dużą skalę staje się kontrola nad zaso-
bami wody.  
 
Słowa kluczowe: rozwój zrównoważony, polityka, mineralne zasoby energetyczne, supremacja polityczna 
 
1. A concise introduction to the nature of sus-
tainability and political activities 
 
The sustainable development as generally under-
stood concept refers to such actions to be undertaken 
which may comply with the needs of the current gen-
eration without depriving future generations of their 
ability to meet their own needs (Bruntland, 1987). 
Thus any responsible debate of how to avoid the cri-
ses, understood however on much wider scale than 
only within the socio-economic sphere, is juxtaposed 
with the concept of sustainability (Zacher, 2007, p. 
141 and further). The assumption as such seems to 
be entirely natural since the latter is seen as an ide-
alistic positive state of affairs (including social, eco-
nomic, environmental, cultural and governance) that 
we all should aspire to achieve (Zacher, Marinova, 
2007, p. 1). Since I am political scientist the ap-
proach to the political aspect of sustainability, but 
placed within the wider perspective seems to be very 
inspiring for me in particular. The political activities 
are not shaped within the vacuum indeed. Thus the 
considerations to what extend purely political deci-
sions depend on the wider context, e.g. motivated by 
the economic power, but also culturally imperialistic 
awareness always belonged to one of the most fasci-
nating problems for many intellectuals.   
The sustainable development may be perceived as 
cognitively and analytically perceived tool of how to 
avoid speculated global disaster. Having in mind the 
latter there is no doubt the rational argumentation 
chosen by decision-makers has definitely to over-
come  the irrational one. This is the way which man-
kind has to consider now in order to begin with solv-
ing their fundamental problems in the future.   
                                                          
2 E.g. Leszek Kuźnicki from the Poland 2000 plus Prognoses Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences consequently 
maintains that global warming is less dangerous than global cooling. 
 
In such a way the previously formulated fears, refer-
ring to the concept of crisis may be placed as the op-
posite to sustainability which is perceived here as 
panacea. Hence the rational arguments on the global 
scale have to be formulated first, and at least gener-
ally approved, and concrete and well-planned steps 
may follow afterwards. However the consensus here 
is still far to reach, what is transparently manifested 
by these scientists’ approach, who oppose e.g. global 
warming2. Another interesting fact is, that also the 
intellectuals who once supported the concept of sus-
tainability still take part in the debate, but represent 
critical approach to it. The latter is interestingly man-
ifested by e.g. Dennis Meadows, who introduces the 
concept of survivable development. He explained its 
essence in his presentation during the annual – in 
2012 - conference of the Club of Rome in Bucharest 
on October 2, 2012. He places it as a notion which 
matters for the future, but refers it to smaller com-
munities like people living in rural communes or 
blocks of flats, and families. Due to Meadows the 
survival oriented activities of such small entities may 
show of how to overcome some challenges in the fu-
ture, and in more effective way than on the global 
scale.  
The approach to the liberal capitalism remains cur-
rently a hot debatable item among many intellectu-
als. It is expressed frequently by their criticism to-
wards ineffective decision-making process within 
the democratic state, the misuse of the natural 
sources, and unreliable financial system. It was di-
rectly formulated by Jørgen Randers, but is also 
mentioned by some other authors, to quote Ugo 
Bardi and his recently published book Der geplün-
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derte Planet (Plundering the Planet) or the contrib-
utors to the common book Money and Sustainability: 
The Missing Link written by Bernard Lietaer, Chris-
tian Arnsperger, Sally Goerner, and Stefan Brunnhu-
ber. Jørgen Randers together with Meadows is one 
of the co-authors of the famous Limits to Growth – a 
report to the Club of Rome published firstly in 1972. 
In 2012 he focused the attention of many readers in 
the world by publishing his newest book (a subse-
quent report to the Club of Rome) titled 2052 A 
Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years. In fact he 
does not perceive it as a typical forecast. I spoke with 
him on that during the above conference in Bucha-
rest. He admitted openly (and more or less in pro-
vocative way) that his research was concentrated on 
the endeavours on that what happens and not on that 
what may happen. The book itself is perceived 
among intellectuals in very diversified, if not critical 
way. Randers, himself a climatologist,  is interested 
in almost all the fields of human beings activities and 
their future shape, hence he refers to economies, en-
ergy, natural resources, climate, food, politics etc. 
He is definitely critical to the current significance of 
the democratic decision making, which is an obstacle 
for the smoothly arranged governance of divided so-
cieties. He seems to be simultaneously fascinated 
with the growing economic and political role of 
China. He demonstrated it while in the Bucharest 
conference by saying in his presentation that the 
Communist Party of China is sensitive to the wish of 
majority to get rich and not sensitive to temptation 
of dictatorship. This definitely interesting and out-
spoken admiration to economic and political prag-
matism encourages me to begin with the short intro-
duction to political activities. 
The phenomenon of politics in its wide understand-
ing as a fusion of conceptual and practical ap-
proaches remains one of the most fascinating and 
cognitively fertile notions within the humanities and 
social sciences. In fact the politics itself has many 
meanings which depend on the individual and cul-
tural experiences and habits. In this respect Bernard 
Crick’s considerations deserve to be mentioned as a 
relative novelty. His revised perception of politics as 
a way of governance over divided societies without 
needless violence seems to be entirely idealistic in-
deed (Crick, 1992). In fact there has always been a 
place for violence within political activities, which, 
however, not always yielded fortuitous results. The 
threat of violence was sufficient to achieve one’s 
aims in very many cases, as with e.g. the infamous 
1938 Munich Agreement and Czechoslovakia’s (co-
ercive) consent to be partitioned. By his approach 
Crick demonstrates that he refers first and foremost 
to the political systems which tolerate the opposition. 
He also suggests in this way that politics in his un-
derstanding should be interpreted as a phenomenon 
that would be mainly applicable in the system of 
government typical of the liberal democracy tradi-
tions. This view is usually well exemplified in prac- 
tice, however, it also narrows down the historically 
verified meaning of the term politics. Thus Crick 
maintains that politics is a sort of activity which en-
ables to reconcile the interests of various social 
groups living at an area and subject to one power. 
These groups are granted the access to the power 
proportionally to their importance for the survival 
and well-being of the whole community (Crick, 
1992).     
However the history of mankind has shown very 
clearly that militarized political activities, namely  in 
the form of war, are also politics in extenso. This 
claim has in fact a long history – it was made a long 
time ago by Carl P.G. von Clausewitz. He was a 
Prussian general and writer, but above all theoreti-
cian of war, which he confirmed in his famous book 
Vom Kriege [About War] (Herberg-Rothe, Honig, 
Moran, 2011; Ryszka, 1975, p. 35-38 and passim). 
There were some agendas which have been pursued 
by coercive methods whether they involved coercive 
persuasion or military activities, which are perceived 
as an extension of purely political activities, namely 
of non-violent nature.  
While observing the socio-political and economic 
history of Europe its internal solidarity is not notice-
able as a long lasting phenomenon, but rather the 
preferences of individual states, once with powerful 
aspirations, matter more. In modern times European 
powers constructed a pattern for such activities 
(Kennedy, 1994, passim; Kissinger, 1996, passim). 
Consequently the latter tendency created in many 
cases a rather unconstructive instead of constructive 
influence on the states’ future cooperation on both 
scales: bilateral and global one. It still continues in 
contemporary times and consequently complicates 
the prognoses for Europe and the rest of the World 
indeed. Thus I presume the irrational factor’s influ-
ence on the decision-making process has to be taken 
into consideration with great attention also now in 
the époque of globalization.  
It should be added that the phenomenon called soli-
darity within Europe or between European states still 
remains one of the most fertile and often mentioned 
European myths.  Thus some examples of the above 
phenomenon would last only for shorter periods, e.g. 
during the Christian wars (crusades) to win back the 
Holy Land from the Muslims particularly in the 11th 
and 12th centuries. In fact it was the solidarity among 
European powers mostly, e.g. after the Congress of 
Vienna, which lasted until the Crimea war outbreak 
in 1854 (Kissinger, 1996, p. 82-108), and not with 
other smaller states or stateless nations. The latter 
entities’ perception might be changed but only due 
to current geopolitical interests of the continental 
powers. Let us quote the France interest towards Ital-
ian independence movement in the 1850s, and prac-
tical lack of it towards the Polish January uprising in 
1863 (Zamoyski, 1997, p. 284). This selective ap-
proach to the solidarity issue continues until now and 
depends solely on the superpowers’ interests and not 
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on moral issues at all. Thus it is not a democratic def-
icit which matters significantly in today’s politics of 
the European Union. With exclusion of the short pe-
riod after the collapse of Berlin Wall in 1989 it is 
rather the solidarity deficit which matters most. 
 
2. Effective and ineffective policy. Selected his-
torical examples   
 
As it was mentioned above, an important reason for 
getting involved in politics was to fulfil own goals 
both by political and military means, with the possi-
bility of changing the allies. This naturally brings to 
mind the rule formulated by sir Henry John Temple, 
better known worldwide as lord Palmerston, a leader 
of British Liberal Party and Prime Minister twice: 
1855-1858 and 1859-1865 (Brown, 2010). He is 
well-known for the phrase about the changing allies 
but permanent interests of Great Britain. Literary the 
proper quotation is as follows: We have no eternal 
allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our inter-
ests are eternal and perpetual, and these interests it 
is our duty to follow (Kissinger, 1996, p. 101; The 
New Indian Express, 2011).   
The above sentence is the core prerequisite for effec-
tiveness in political activities. Simultaneously its ap-
proval as a constant and sole rule forms the basis for 
the cynical treatment of other participants in these 
activities, which may be understood as political 
pragmatism  in its euphemistic form. Winston 
Churchill seems to be a classic follower of Palmer-
ston, which is reflected in some of the Churchill’s 
political dictums. The most famous one refers to de-
mocracy although it does not concern directly  Palm-
erston’s axiom. On November 11, 1947, Churchill 
said that democracy is the worst form of government, 
except for all those other forms that have been tried 
from time to time (Democracy and Churchill, 2003). 
His cynical and rigid reference to Palmerston’s opin-
ion – by some British intellectualists called the 
Churchill’s specific sense of humour, which I per-
sonally heard while attending some research confer-
ences - was manifested by him transparently in many 
other cases. Let us quote two of them. The first one 
concerns the outbreak of the Irish Civil War in Dub-
lin on June 28, 1922. While the Four Courts (Dublin 
Tribunal – WK) was burning, Churchill was asked 
in the House of Commons about its great law library 
and irreplaceable records and documents (Cronin, 
1980, p. 152-153). His comment was symptomatic: 
a State without archives is better than archives with-
out a State (Cronin, 1980, p. 153). Churchill has 
been extremely pragmatic also in his statements of 
the role of Josip Broz Tito’s partisan army in the 
struggle against the Nazi Germany in the Balkans 
during WW II. General Fitzroy Maclean, the then 
British emissary working with Tito on behalf of 
Churchill, once realized Tito was a Communist. The 
British Prime Minister replied by saying that neither 
Maclean nor Churchill will be living in Yugoslavia 
after the war (Koseski, 2002, p. 158; New York 
Times, 1996).    
Contrary to this sort of cynical, but finally effective 
political activeness is the missionary approach  to it, 
which often ends with futile results. Thus, there are 
not many examples in history of political effective-
ness without cynicism. The foreign policy of Polish-
Lithuanian state known as the Commonwealth of 
Both Nations until the end of the 18th century re-
mains here a special and simultaneously misfortu-
nate example. In order to exemplify it some cases 
deserve to be mentioned. The first one concerns 
Hungaro-Polish involvement in the anti-Turkish cru-
sade in 1443-1444, and the second one refers to the 
mostly Polish involvement in 1683 in the battle 
which finished the Turkish siege of Vienna. Hungary 
first (until beginning of the 16th century) and then 
Poland (until the end of the 17th century) played the 
role of a rampart of Christendom, antemurale Chris-
tianitatis in Latin (Davies, 1981, p. 125 and further; 
Zamoyski, 1997, passim), during the Ottoman Tur-
key expansion in particular. Due to the partitions of 
Commonwealth – by Russia, Prussia and Austria – 
its political and military position deteriorated and fi-
nally resulted in a loss of its independent status in 
1795.   
However some 20th century (and early 21st century) 
examples confirm that ethically oriented political ac-
tivities might bring successful results for some lead-
ers and the movements led by them. It is well mani-
fested by Mahatma Gandhi’s, Nelson Mandela’s, 
Martin Luther King’s, the Dalai Lama’s, and even 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s – the Burmese democratic op-
position leader – philosophy of pacifist political ac-
tions. On the other hand, they do not confirm the 
general rule for effective politics across the centu-
ries, which in most cases is less ethical and more 
pragmatic and, in fact, deliberately egoistic.    
 
3. The mineral energy sources and a temptation 
for political supremacy – some cases 
 
The exploration of mutual dependencies between 
mineral energy sources and political, including mili-
tary, activities may be exemplified by a very rich tra-
dition confirmed on a broad international scale. In 
terms of results it is often manifested by a temptation 
for political supremacy. It may also be a proper 
measure of the effectiveness of political activities. 
Several cases mentioned below are my own selection 
and may be supplemented by many others indeed.    
At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries coal mining 
industry and steel production became the basis for 
global and militarily verified supremacy. It was a po-
litical issue within the internal realities of the rapidly 
industrializing European powers and the United 
States of America. These two spheres formed the 
hinterland for economic, political and military com-
petition between the II German Reich and Great Brit-
ain in particular. The German sources of the iron ore 
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in Lorraine guaranteed the large scale of steel pro-
duction and stimulated Berlin’s appetites for their 
usage (Tarle, 1957, p. 16-21). Thus this competition 
finally became a catalyst for the imperially oriented 
policy of these two powers, which ultimately led to 
the outbreak of WW I. The newly born large indus-
trial entities deliberately endorsed and accelerated 
this competition. The other then powers, excluding 
France perhaps, belonging to both military blocs, 
namely Austro-Hungary, Italy, Tsarist Russia, and 
Ottoman Turkey, were not able to cope with that 
challenge. They were rather dedicated to their geo-
political and colonial ambitions on a large (France, 
Russia), and regional (Austro-Hungary, Italy) scale 
(Ferro, 1997, passim; Moczulski, 2000, passim).   
The temptation to reach supremacy does not neces-
sarily refer to the endeavours of the main political 
players, namely, the global powers. It may also serve 
as a temporarily applied blackmailing tool of nomi-
nally weaker entities towards the stronger ones and 
is manifested as a sort of regional solidarity against 
the common enemy’s supporters. Such a decision 
was announced by the Arab members of the OPEC 
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), 
including Egypt, Syria and Tunisia, in October of 
1973. They forced the oil companies to increase the 
oil prices to an enormously high level. It was their 
reaction to the USA decision to supply weapons and 
other logistic supplies to Israel during the Yom Kip-
pur war. The embargo continued until March of 1974 
(OPEC states…, 1973;   Horton, 1973; OPEC Oil Em-
bargo, 1974).  
The possession of energy sources may also form a 
basis for pro-independence activities, as well as a 
guarantee of stable statehood in the future. This spe-
cial case fits neatly endeavours and argumentation of 
the Scottish National Party (SNP) towards Scottish 
independence. The discovery of oil fields in the 
North Sea off the coast of Scotland created an eco-
nomically and politically fertile ground for such ar-
gumentation. During the 1970s the slogan  It’s Scot-
land’s oil became part of it and is currently used in 
the pre-referendum campaign for Scottish independ-
ence (Kaczorowska, 2009, p. 297; SNP, 2013). 
The policy of large regional powers towards non-
militarily manifested supremacy over weaker states 
in the region has been for some time manifested by 
Russia and her natural gas based political activities 
versus Poland and Ukraine in particular (Opioła, 
Omelan, 2012, p. 7 and passim; Russia/Ukraine: 
Gazprom…, 2012). Thus the traditional Russian ex-
pansionism accompanied by the authoritative politi-
cal culture and imperial past is frequently recalled 
here as a phenomenon still in existence (Whist, 2008, 
p. 22-25). It is fair to say that also the USA natural 
gas based policy is often identified as monopolistic, 
however, America is perceived almost uncritically in 
Poland, in contrast with Russia. 
Let us put aside the criticism of Russia’s rigid energy 
policy, which in fact is a cognitively interesting 
proof of the linkage between the Russian Gazprom’s 
desire to make profit and Russian government’s to 
use the dominating position of the former. Paradox-
ically such a policy may be perceived as a potentially 
positive factor for the Central-East European coun-
tries’ regional identity, but in fact it is not. It might 
be also dangerous for Russia in her former temporary 
financial troubles, as it was shown sometimes at the 
Moscow stock exchange in particular.  In one aspect 
it verifies negatively the (non)existence of the al-
ready mentioned solidarity within the region and 
also within the EU common space. In official state-
ments Germany’s pro-Nord Stream policy with Rus-
sia as a partner was oriented on economic gains only, 
hence from the purely economic viewpoint it is a rea-
sonable venture, but it is short sighted in terms of 
mutual confidence of the states in the region, not to 
mention the ecological risks (Nord Stream…, 2013). 
The other verification of this solidarity deficit came 
from Norway, a country which is not interested in 
delivering its gas for preferential prices to these 
countries, which feel uncomfortable with one sup-
plier only, namely Russia (Opioła, Omelan, 2012, p. 
9-10). Such a gesture would not cost Norway too 
much and above all may have a positive impact on 
the spirit of cooperation. At the same time, the once 
presented Swedish or Finnish readiness to criticize 
the Nord Stream issue did not appear to be a strategic 
approach, but rather a tactical action with some mil-
itary and ecological concerns in mind (Whist, 2008: 
30-35). It may be called a one-sided approach. Po-
land’s critical attitude towards the Nord Stream does 
not seem to be sincere either, particularly given the 
fact that Poland has become too dependent on the 
American military technologies on the one hand and 
constantly suspicious towards Russian policy inten-
tions on the other.  
At the moment it is hard to predict how the shale gas 
may influence the position of those states which have 
their natural gas fields. However there is only one 
state, which has an evident supremacy in the shale 
exploitation technologies, namely the USA. There-
fore further progress in shale gas mining may under-
mine Russia’s natural gas monopoly in the Central-
Eastern Europe. On the other hand there is a large 
criticism from the ecological organizations towards 
any undertakings in this matter worldwide (Energy 
in Depth.., 2013). The critical approach towards the 
US such practices became an object of interest 
among the film makers either, to quote Promised 
Land, the Gus Van Sant and Matt Damon movie, 
shown in recent 2013 Berlin Festival (Berlin Film 
Festival…, 2013). 
The last case study here, not so well known, but fas-
cinating cognitively and analytically, refers to the 
Gran Chaco War of 1932-1935. Therefore it is ana-
lyzed in greater detail than the ones above. This con-
flict serves as one of the most transparent proofs of 
the powers’ and large-scale corporate entities’ in-
trigues resulting in the military conflict between less 
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powerful and manipulated states3. The key prerequi-
sites for this war were the approximate oil-fields ex-
ploitation together with large-scale corporate enti-
ties & states’ interests, and intra-continental states’ 
competition. The Gran Chaco area is located in the 
South-American interior and comprises a large 
steppe plain, triangular in shape, 150 000 sq miles 
in area, embracing part of Bolivia, Paraguay and 
north-western Argentina (Mroziewicz, Rómmel, 
1973, p. 57). The object of the long lasting dispute 
between the two first mentioned states was part of 
Argentina called Chaco Boreal. For decades its main 
attraction were woods rich in the species of a tree 
called quebracho (Rómmel, 1972, p. 96), which pro-
vided sought after tanning extract. In the colonial 
times this area belonged to the Caracas Province, 
which later became the independent Bolivia. The lat-
ter state had more rights to it according to the rule uti 
possidetis juris what means that the Latin American 
states have the right to own the areas of the former 
colonial administration from which they come (Ró-
mmel, Mroziewicz, 1973, p. 58). Paraguay, on the 
other hand, kept recalling the rule that already in the 
late 18th century the governor of the province ordered 
to build defensive forts on the right bank of the river 
Paraguay. It was motivated by the fact that the access 
to Chaco Boreal was easier from Paraguay than from 
Bolivia. Consequently, in the early 20th century, the 
Paraguayan government granted concessions to the 
foreign capital to exploit the forests. Simultaneously 
the attempts at settling the dispute were taken mainly 
by Bolivia.   
In the late 1920s the dispute about Chaco Boreal 
went much further than just  the conflict of interests 
of the two states. In 1926, disregarding Argentinean 
pressure, the government of Bolivia granted the 
American petroleum company, Standard Oil, a li-
cence to work at the disputed area (ca 23 million of 
acres, Rómmel, Mroziewicz, 1973, p. 60). The com-
pany carried on considerable development work, 
drilling and refining. But there was no outlet for this 
oil except through Paraguay, Brazil, or Argentina.  
Brazil (...) generously offered a port on the Parana, 
but Paraguay, controlled by Argentina, thereupon 
refused to let the oil come through except under con-
ditions Bolivia would not meet (Beals, 1940, p. 340). 
Standard Oil was checkmated. Argentina itself rep-
resented indirectly the interests of another petroleum 
company, the British-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell. So 
finally Paraguay and Bolivia went to open war in 
1932, although the first armed incidents had begun 
already in 1928. It is quite obvious that both states, 
but Paraguay to a greater extent, were victims of Ar-
gentina’s scheming and imperial ambitions. Thus the 
bitter comment of the latter made by journalist, Hu-
bert Herring that the chief sinner is Argentina (,,,) 
deliberately egging Paraguay on in order to weaken 
                                                          
3 The Gran Chaco War was analyzed in details in: W. 
Konarski, Isolationism, Dependency and Clientelism as 
Bolivia and to give Argentina the chance to extend 
her economic thrust seems particularly acute (Beals, 
1940, p. 342). 
The direct struggle ended with a ceasefire agreement 
in June of 1935, and the final peace treaty was signed 
in Buenos Aires on July 28, 1938. Fierce fighting 
took place in uninhabited, covered with the jungle, 
often deprived of water, areas. Paraguay gained the 
military victory, but at the price of 50 thousand of 
lost soldiers and officers. The losses of Bolivia were 
still greater, reaching 70 thousand (Mroziewicz, Ró-
mmel, 1973, p. 61). 
This war remains an example of a conflict in which 
not the victorious army but the instigators, scheming 
behind the backs of the fighting sides, gain the most. 
This also concerned the profits obtained from 
providing weapons to the parties in conflict. The 
cynical attitude of Great Britain, which provided am-
munition and weapons both to Bolivia and Paraguay 
came prominently to the fore (Beals, 1940, p. 125). 
The Italian military mission operated in Paraguay at 
the end of the war. It is also worth to know that Par-
aguay obtained weapons from Japan (Beals, 1940, p. 
42). 
Paraguay was granted almost three quarters of the 
disputed area, embracing ca 250 thousand square kil-
ometres (Mroziewicz, Rómmel, 1973, p. 62). This 
favourable for Paraguay decision was inspired by 
Great Britain. Paraguay was the second, besides Ar-
gentina, true beneficiary of the military conflict. De-
spite that, in the course of time the influence of Great 
Britain gradually decreased in favour of the USA. It 
deserves to be mentioned that over almost 80 years 
which followed, no commercial amounts of oil were 
discovered in the part of the Chaco awarded to Para-
guay, which is a sort of a tragic irony. As late as on 
November 26, 2012, Paraguayan President, Federico 
Franco announced the finding of oil reserves in the 
area.  
 
Instead of summing-up  
 
There is no doubt that the owners of mineral energy 
resources will be tempted to utilize them as a tool in 
their strictly political plans in the future. On the other 
hand, however, the experiences in that issue gained 
so far, sometimes very dangerous for the mankind, 
may also show the necessity for much deeper reflec-
tion here.  
Thus in order to minimize a potential for future con-
flict based on the possession of mineral energy 
sources it is necessary to prepare and shape a new 
and rational energy policy on a European and world 
scale, at least in collaboration with the intellectuals 
as the main participants and contributors. Three steps 
are crucial here:  
Traditional Features of the Paraguayan Foreign Policy, in: 
Politeja no 2(12) 2009. 
Konarski/Problemy Ekorozwoju/Problems of Sustainable Development 1/2014,  63-70  
 
69 
1. Drawing up a protocol of divergences in all the 
visions of energy policy of all the countries 
now and in predictable future;  
2. Finding a commonly accepted ground for the 
implementation of such a policy;  
3. Perceiving solidarity as a real, and not only de-
clared, value for such a policy for the common 
benefit of all its participants, instead of eco-
nomic and political selfishness. 
In the context of the historical experiences it is en-
tirely idealistic to believe that these steps might ever 
materialize. History shows that international con-
flicts, involving many states, including devastating 
wars, have always been the result of the unbearable 
burden of egoism, if to rephrase the title of Milan 
Kundera’s famous book. On the other hand, we are 
homo sapiens and not homo insipiens, who live in 
globalized space, where no one is the sole winner, 
but many can lose a lot. Thus a generally understood 
energy policy should serve as a tool for the creation 
of a socio-political stability and not for elaborating a 
new version of  economic and political supremacy. 
It is perhaps a sign of naivety, but as history shows 
even brief intervals of internal solidarity on a global 
scale can help to reach the long-lasting stability.  
Thus the policy-making today (including that for the 
energy sector), must heed the Palmerston’s axiom, if 
only because its interpretation is beneficial for com-
mon interests, and not only those of the most power-
ful states. It is a complicated puzzle indeed, but we 
have to pursue our efforts in this direction. The revi-
talization of the UN activities in this sphere seems to 
be one of necessary prerequisites to accelerate the 
above processes. In this context the growing role of 
the Pacific powers’ phenomenon has to be taken into 
consideration either.  
The latter is recognized by the Club of Rome. Since 
this Club is mentioned at the beginning of this article 
I will close the above considerations with remarks 
referring to the current and future activities of this 
organization. There exists a concrete challenge for 
the Club of Rome in the nearest future as far as the 
energy policy is concerned. The Club should serve 
not only as a source of analyses and warnings and a 
catalyst for emergency actions for national and 
global leaders (and as a kick to the societies due to 
the literary expression of Randers) as it has been no-
ticeable so far. What seems to be particularly im-
portant is to endorse its position as the intellectually 
effective and seriously perceived adviser in the 
world decision making processes.  The Club’s activ-
ities may be more known and particularly influential 
due to the growing interest towards them from China 
and Indonesia either. Thus the Club of Rome itself 
may be a real and not speculated tool for overcoming 
plutocracy by meritocracy, hence the idea of sustain-
ability may be revitalised as well.  From the one side 
my approach here seems to be again idealistic, if to 
juxtapose it with the logic of current capitalistic de-
velopment. However from the other side the idealism 
itself has always been an asset in the intellectuals’ 
hand. It may lead to more influential debate on the 
world scale, and be perceived as a sort of pressure 
from this special group on the towards world and na-
tional leaders. For our common sake political deci-
sions and science have to be in fundamental relation-
ship, as Mugur Isărescu, the President of the Na-
tional Bank of Romania said during the Club of 
Rome Conference in Bucharest. Perhaps it is reason-
able here to change slightly the sentence of almost 
entirely forgotten Angela Davis who once said:  what 
this country needs is more unemployed politicians 
into what the World needs is more unemployed poli-
ticians (Inspiring Quotes, 2013). Then these who 
keep their job will be more empathic.  
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